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This chapter opens a new philosophical perspective onto human mortality by 
elaborating three classical phenomenological arguments about human life. First, it 
demonstrates that classical phenomenology provides powerful conceptual tools for 
the articulation of the different senses of death crucial to human experience: death 
as an endpoint, death as event, death as interruption, and death as threat. Second, 
the chapter shows that the phenomenological distinction between the different 
senses of death makes possible a deepened understanding of Epicurus’ famous 
statement according to which our own death should not concern us. Finally, this 
chapter argues that mortality is not simply the opposite of life but has a constructive 
function in the constitution of cultural objectivities and the cultural world.
Phenomenology is a transcendental-philosophical investigation into the correlation 
between subjectivity and objectivity, or consciousness and being, which is 
fundamental to all human experience. It aims to disclose the essential features 
of the intentional acts that take part in the constitution of the different senses of 
objectivity and being, operative in human and animal experiences. In addition to 
intentional acts, phenomenology also illuminates the passive aesthetic synthesis 
that establishes the most rudimentary, primordial objectivities on which acts can 
operate. As such, phenomenology demonstrates how the different senses of being 
result from the constitutive activities and passivities of conscious subjects. It covers 
the whole variety of ontic sense: the being of material things, living things, persons, 
utensils, tools, values; theoretical entities, practical aims and goals, linguistic units, 
works of art; images, pictures, memories; real, possible, probable; present, absent, 
past, and future.
Phenomenology comes in many variations and styles. The hermeneutical 
variation, established by Martin Heidegger, distances itself from Edmund Husserl’s 
original formulation of phenomenology by means of a powerful historical critique 
of the operative concepts of consciousness and subjectivity. Maurice Merleau-
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Ponty’s existential phenomenology for its part emphasizes the importance of 
embodiment and affectivity in the constitution of the perceptual world, its saliences 
and affordances.
In the study of death and mortality, Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology 
has long been the dominant discourse. In his Being and Time, Heidegger argued 
that the experience of mortality has a crucial role in our self-understanding: by 
facing the possibility of death and by grasping the limits of our existence and its 
historical-situational character, we become conscious of our own possibilities as 
such, i.e. as our own in distinction from the general possibilities of human beings.1 
Thus we win an authentic sense of our being, a sense in which possibilities reign 
over actualities.
Due to Heidegger’s vehement critique of all philosophies of consciousness and 
subjectivity, classical Husserlian phenomenology has long been neglected as an 
outdated form of Cartesian subjectivism, solipsism, and idealism. Husserl has been 
accused of disregarding the fundamental structures of facticity and embodiment, 
as well as the phenomena of death and mortality, when focusing his studies on the 
constitutive activities of consciousness and conscious subjects.
I will challenge this view by arguing that Husserl’s classical phenomenology 
offers fruitful starting points for the study of human death. The gain of familiarizing 
ourselves with these sources is double. Husserl’s reflections involve insights 
that complement and enrich the Heideggerian discourse of being-towards-death 
dominant in Continental philosophy. These reflections do not prioritize any one 
sense of death as more authentic or more genuine than others but explicate several 
different senses that are crucial to our personal and communal lives as human 
beings. In addition, Husserlian sources also allow us to find a fruitful new approach 
to the idea of death as an evil or harm widely discussed in analytical philosophy. 
They help distinguish between different types of harm, and by implication allow us 
to keep separate different forms of caution and prudence.
With these two purposes in mind, I will explicate and elaborate three Husserlian 
insights into human death. First, I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology of 
embodiment and intersubjectivity provides powerful conceptual tools for the 
articulation of the different senses of death crucial to human experience: death as 
an endpoint of a natural process, death as a historical event, death as interruption, 
and death as threat. Second, I intend to show that the classical phenomenological 
analysis of the sense of death makes possible a deepened understanding of 
Epicurus’ famous statement according to which our own death should not concern 
us. Finally, I argue that Husserl’s classical analyses demonstrate that mortality is 
not simply the opposite of life but has a constructive function in the constitution 
1 I discuss Heidegger’s phenomenology of death in another article, “Being towards death,” 
included in Schott (ed.) 2010. The volume also contains another article, “Future and others,” in 
which I discuss three early critics of Heidegger – Emmanuel Lévinas, Hannah Arendt, and Simone 
de Beauvoir – and their discourses on selfhood, mortality, and generativity. 
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of cultural objectivities and the cultural world. The chapter explicates these three 
Husserlian insights and shows how they relate to one another.
Before focusing on the topics of death and mortality, however, I will first 
summarize the main results of Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of human 
embodiment since this analysis provides methodological guidelines for the 
discussion of mortality. This is the task of the first section. In the three subsequent 
sections, I will then explicate and discuss Husserl’s contribution to the philosophy 
of death and mortality: the second section distinguishes between the different 
senses of death, the third section studies the harm of death and our indifference to 
it, and  the last section proceeds to examine the constructive role of death in our 
cultural life.
A Phenomenology of Human Embodiment
Classical Husserlian phenomenology makes a clear distinction between the human 
body as it is lived in perception and the human body as it is objectified in different 
kinds of activities and practices, from everyday occupations to scientific reflections. 
On the one hand, our bodies are aspects of ourselves as perceiving subjects and, 
on the other hand, our bodies are perceived things among other worldly things. 
All bodily states and processes can be considered from these two perspectives: 
simple movements and sensations, such as pleasure, pain and dizziness, as well 
as complex bodily states and processes, such as ecstasy, sickness, and old age. 
Death, too, can be considered in two different ways: as a structural feature of our 
experiencing and as experienced reality.2
Both perspectives are implicated in the specific way in which our living bodies 
relate to themselves in perception. When a human being touches herself, or 
when she hears herself cry or laugh, she both captures herself as a perceptual 
object (the touched) and at the same time she lives in the sensual activity of 
perceiving (touching).3 In such experiences, our bodies are given to us both as 
sensed objectivities (Gegenständlichkeit) and as centers of our movements and 
sensations, and moreover these two positions are not separable phenomena but 
are reciprocal and interchangeable, appearing as two aspects of one and the same 
phenomenon.4 They can be distinguished in analysis, but they cannot be separated 
or detached in experience.
Here ‘objectification’ does not mean any negative operation – alienation or 
estrangement – but must be understood as a necessary structural feature of all 
2 For a more detailed account of these two attitudes, see Heinämaa 2003, 21–51; Heinämaa 
2011.
3 Husserl Hua4, 96/101, 145–147/153–155. The pagination given first refers to the original source, 
and the pagination that follows this, after the slash, refers to the English translation.
4 This fundamental phenomenon is called “double sensation” or “double apprehension” (Husserl 
Hua4, 147/155; Stein 1917, 47–48/43–44; Merleau-Ponty 1993 (1945), 109/93).
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experience of worldly phenomena. To be sure, the fact that we objectify ourselves, 
other human beings, and other living beings in perception allows for different forms 
of abuse, violence, and mishandling, but perceptual objectification as such is not 
an act of violence.5
Another phenomenological distinction that is crucial to philosophical reflections 
on mortality is the distinction between two different ways in which we can intend 
human bodies as worldly entities: on the one hand we can relate to human bodies as 
an expressive totalities (Leib) and on the other hand we can study them as a mere 
material things (Körper).6 The main source of this distinction is in the unpublished 
second part of Husserl’s work Ideas,7 but all later phenomenologists used it in their 
analyses of the human condition.8
The starting point of Husserl’s analysis in Ideas II is the fact that we can thematize 
and study living bodies in two fundamentally different ways. On the one hand, we 
can take the attitude of the natural scientist and abstract all value and purpose 
away from the bodies that we study and conceive them as merely material entities. 
When we proceed in this way, the positions and movements of bodies appear to 
us as various effects of external and internal causes, and it becomes possible to 
explain and predict their behaviors by subsuming them under the general laws of 
the biological and physical sciences. On the other hand, we can – and we do – 
relate to living bodies as meaningful and purposeful wholes. As such, living bodies 
belong to animal agents and to human persons. We grasp them as instruments 
5 Cf. Morris 1999.
6 A usual notion is that Husserl’s distinction between Leib and Körper, i.e. the distinction 
between the body of a living being (human or animal) and an inert material thing, would coincide 
with the distinction between the body-as-lived-in-1st-person and the body-as-observed-in-3rd-
person. I have argued elsewhere that the two distinctions are not identical and must not be lumped 
together (Heinämaa 2011). The first distinction is between two different types of perceptible and 
experienceable entities; the latter is between two types of relations to living beings. Husserl himself 
argues that we can take an observational and objectifying (3rd person) perspective on the living 
bodies of others and, via others, on our own living bodies (e.g. Husserl Hua1, 123/91; Hua4, 162–
168, 170–178; Hua6, 107–108). In other words, we can objectify our living bodies and the living 
bodies of others as we experience them in motivational and expressive nexuses; and we have to 
objectify them, for example, in the practices of sports, physical training, therapeutic treatment, and 
warfare. When we do this, we do not treat living bodies as mere material things or as pieces of 
inert matter. Rather we insert them as wholes in the universal network of causes and effects and 
study them in such networks. The fields of life sciences and behavioral sciences depend on this 
possibility.
 This of course depends on our possibility of experiencing our own bodies as instruments of 
will, as zero points of spatial orientation, and as fields of sensation, but to state this is to state a 
relationship of conditioning and not to determine the limit of the objectifying attitude (see Heinämaa, 
2011).
 Another usual notion is that the distinction between the body-as-lived-in-1st-person and the 
body-as-observed-in-3rd-person would equal the distinction between the expressive body and the 
physical body (the merely material thing). This does not hold either, since the observational attitude 
is not restricted to physical or merely material things. We can also observe and make systematic 
observations of living bodies, on their gestures, expressions, and modes of conduct; and we do this, 
for example, in the practices of negotiation, trade, and dance as well as in the sciences (scientific 
practices) of zoology and medicine.
7 Most importantly in Hua4, but see also Hua5 and Hua6 and the early accounts included in 
Hua13 and Hua16.
8 E.g., Stein 1917; Sartre 1943; Merleau-Ponty 1945; Beauvoir 1949; Heidegger 2001 (1987).
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and as expressions that belong to goal-directed and self-shaping subjects. In this 
case, our own activity and interest is not in explaining or predicting the behavior of 
the bodies, but in responding to their movements and gestures.9 Husserl calls this 
attitude ‘personalistic’.
These two attitudes to the living body are not on equal footing in Husserl’s 
analysis. He argues that the primary way in which living bodies are thematized 
in experience is personalistic and expressive. We do not perceive living bodies 
– animal or human – as bio-mechanisms, or as human-made artifacts, but as 
expressive means, motivated by sensations and feelings, directed by intentions 
and purposes and responsive to affects and appeals.
Making Sense of Death
In Sickness unto Death, Søren Kierkegaard warns against the tendency to 
conceptualize death simply as an event or happening in intersubjective time. In the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, he refers to the fragility of our existence and 
writes:
Suppose death were insidious enough to come tomorrow! Just this uncertainty, if it 
is to be understood and held firm by an existing person and consequently be thought 
into everything precisely because it is uncertainty (…) so that I make it clear to myself 
whether I am beginning something worth beginning (…) – this uncertainty already gives 
rise to unbelievable difficulties (…). If, however, the uncertainty of death is something 
in general, then my dying is also something general. Perhaps dying is something in 
general for systematicians, for absentminded people. (…) But for me, my dying is by 
no means something in general; for others, my dying is some such thing in general.10 
The idea here is that we should not assume that death is given in a similar 
way to all persons involved, the dying subject, the mourning survivors, and casual 
passers-by. To be sure, all these people live in the same space-time. The witnesses 
of death, however, experience a temporal wordly event or a process – devastating 
perhaps, or unthinkable or unbearable, but proceeding in time and preceding other 
events.11 Time, however, is ‘running out’ for one person in a crucial and specific 
sense, or, as Heidegger put it, “the end is impending.”12 Kierkegaard warns that if 
we confine ourselves to thinking about death merely as an event or as a worldly 
9 Husserl Hua4, 183–239/192–250; cf. Stein 1917, 44–60/41–54.
10 Kierkegaard 1960 (1846), 167/VII 139.
11 Merleau-Ponty argues that such experiences disclose two different layers of experiencing, the 
personal and the anonymous: “While I am overcome by some grief and wholly given over to my 
distress, my eyes already stray in front of me, and are drawn, despite everything, to some shining 
object ” (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1993 (1945), 100, 84; cf. Heinämaa 2015).
12 Heidegger 1993 (1927), 250/293.
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happening, we shut ourselves from death as that which might show us our singular 
lives “as true.”13
How should we understand this warning? What is at issue here?
The phenomenological account of embodiment outlined above helps to clarify 
the problems involved in the tendency to reduce the meaning of death to an event. 
It shows that this reduction14 can take two different forms: a natural scientific and 
a personalistic. Superficially these are different, but from the point of view of 
Kierkegaard’s argument about the singularity of death they function in the same 
way.
In the natural scientific reduction, we think about our own death as a natural end 
of our biological or organic life, similar to the perishing of animals and the wilting 
and withering of plants and comparable to the breakdown of machines, such as 
the ‘dying’ of an engine. In such reflections, our death is given to us as one natural 
occurrence among other natural occurrences. One particular organism ceases to 
exist in objective space and time, but the world persists and life goes on.
In the personalistic reduction, we study ourselves and other human beings as 
meaning-producing expressive subjects and spontaneous agents. Accordingly, 
death is not just an end of an organism but also an end of a unique and original 
perspective to the world as a whole. Thus the personalistic reduction may seem 
humanly or ethically less problematic than the naturalistic one since it acknowledges 
that something irreplaceable is lost forever.
However, from the point of view of Kierkegaard’s caution, the personalistic 
reduction equals the naturalistic one in confusing two perspectives on dying: own 
and alien, immediate and mediated. In both reductions, we insert our own death 
into objective time, as an event among other events, and avoid thinking through the 
special kind of temporality that characterizes the ending of our own subjectivity. 
Instead of facing our own death and understanding its relation to our life, past and 
present, we postulate or imagine a future event in intersubjective time, a worldy 
event that we ourselves cannot experience or live through but that is given to others 
basically in the very same way as any other event. The others see it happening, 
they can empathize with us, and they may mourn our absence, but afterwards, 
when the dreadful moment has passed, they necessarily attend to other things – 
however senseless or insignificant such things may appear to them in relation to the 
loss. We, however, do not experience any such loss or change, for we have ceased 
13 Kierkegaard 1950 (1849), 99; cf. Heidegger 1993 (1927), 236–239/279–283.
14 The term ”reduction” is here used in the general sense of an account that brings a complex 
phenomenon back to one of its parts or aspects. So at this point, I am not talking about the 
phenomenological-transcendental method of reduction that proceeds from worldly objectivities to 
their subjective correlates and conditions.
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to exist as experiencing subjects. There is a fundamental difference between these 
two perspectives.15
This does not imply that as survivors we would be unaffected by the death of 
others: the loss of a beloved one may color and tone our lives till the end; and even 
the death of a total stranger may change our ways of seeing and experiencing 
the world. Moreover, the other’s death may affect our relation to our selves in a 
fundamental way and turn our lives to a completely new direction.16 Kierkegaard 
does not deny any of this but merely points out that the two perspectives – the 
perspective of the dying person and the perspective of all others – are distinct and 
cannot be reduced one to the other. My death as it is given to me differs from my 
death as it appears to any other, and the other’s death as it is given to her differs 
from what I can witness happening to her.
Emmanuel Lévinas expresses the common problem of the two reductive 
approaches to death by saying that in both cases death is thought in the perspective 
of the “survivors.”17 In the natural-scientific reduction, death is inserted into the 
objective time of natural history; in the personalistic reduction, it is posited as an 
event in the intersubjective time of human history:
Birth and death as punctuous moments, and the interval that separates them, are 
lodged in this universal time of the historian, who is a survivor. [For the historiocrapher] 
interiority as such is a “nothing,” “pure thought,” nothing but thought.18
Neither form of thinking captures the special form of lived time or immanent 
temporality that structures conscious life and frames our human experience of 
mortality. In both forms of reduction, we avoid posing the question about our own 
death and its meaning for the wholeness of our life and the givenness of the world. 
We think about some related or similar worldly phenomena, the collapse of devices 
and mechanical systems, the death of animals and plants, the death of our near 
ones and beloved ones, and fail facing our own death as the “possible impossibility 
of every way of existing.”19
Two misunderstandings should be clarified. The point is not that my own death 
is more important or more significant to me or to my life than the death of someone 
else. The argument is about the meaning of death, but here ‘meaning’ does not 
15 The “perspective of survivors,” as Lévinas calls it, covers both the perspective of the near 
ones who in sympathy attend to the suffering of the dying patient (i.e. the 2nd person perspective) 
as well as the “perspective” of the bystanders who observe the event without personal interest 
(i.e. the 3rd person perspective). The perspective of medical and care personnel at hospitals and 
hospices usually combines these two perspectives because medical care of patients involves both 
therapeutic-manipulative skills and emotional-communicative expertise.
16 Cf. Merleau-Ponty 1993 (1945), 96–101/80–85; Dastur 1994.
17 Lévinas 1971 (1961), 47–49/55–56; cf. Kierkegaard 1960 (1846), 154–177/VII127–147; Heidegger 
1993 (1927), 237–240/281–284, 246–247/291.
18 Lévinas 1971 (1961), 55.
19 Heidegger 1993 (1927), 262/307.
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denote worth, valence, or importance, but the intentional structure of experience. 
So the claim is not that my own death affects me emotionally in a more fundamental 
way than the death of the other, but rather that in order to understand what the 
other’s death means to her, I need to have a relation to my own mortality.20 So an 
eternal consciousness or an immortal person, such as Virginia Woolf’s Orlando 
or J.M. Barrie’s Peter Pan,21 can be affected by the deaths of others, even greatly 
and deeply, but in so far as such persons cannot die, they cannot experience what 
it means to live with the consciousness of the possibility of dying and thus cannot 
understand what death means to us humans.
Another possible misunderstanding confuses the question of meaning with the 
question of knowledge. I may come to realize that I will eventually die, not by reflecting 
on the processes of my own life, but by experiencing the death of someone else. 
Children, for example, usually start asking questions about death and mortality 
when exposed to dead animals; and in adult life, the death of a parent is often 
an awakening and disenchanting experience. However, the phenomenological 
argument is not about the way in which we come to realize a possibility, but is 
about the meaning of this possibility. The argument does not include a stand on 
the question of how one comes to realize that one dies, but concerns the meaning 
of this possibility.
So the argument is not that my own death or life is more important or more 
significant to me than someone else’s death or life, but that I can only understand 
the meaning of death by facing the possibility of my own death, and by studying 
what implications this “impossible possibility” has to my life here and now.
The Impossibility of Dying and an Epicurean Wisdom
We can deepen this account of the different perspectives on death, and the different 
senses they disclose, with the help of Husserl’s phenomenology of temporality.
The core of Husserl’s analysis of time is the argument that lived time, time as 
we experience it in sensations and perceptions and in cognitive, volitional and 
practical acts, is not a series of punctual moments or self-enclosed points but is an 
original unity.22 In a manuscript, Husserl formulates the point with the concept of 
nativity by writing: “new birth belongs to every present as a mundane occurrence 
20 The second person perspective to mortality and death is discussed extensively by the German 
phenomenologist Michael Theunissen (1991, 197ff.) and by the French phenomenologist Françoise 
Dastur (1994, 1998). For the distinction between the first and the second person perspective to 
mortality and death, see, Heinämaa 2010, 104ff. For more personal philosophical discussions, see, 
Beauvoir’s Une mort trè douche (1946), in English A Very Easy Death) and La céremonie des adieux 
(1981, in English Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre) and Roland Barthes’ Mourning Diary (2009).
21 Orlando is Woolf’s main character in the novel of the same name (1928). In addition to being 
immortal, Orlando also appears in different genders: s/he lives both as a woman and as a man. 
Peter Pan is a J.M. Barrie’s character in the play and novel Peter and Wendy (1911); Peter is a boy 
who can fly and who never grows up.
22 See esp. Husserl Hua10; Hua11, 125–145/170–192.
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but then also as a transcendental occurrence.”23 Each moment of lived time bears 
internal references to all other moments and each opens up in two directions, the 
past and the present.24
Husserl distinguished this inner time or lived time from the intersubjective 
time which is shared equally by all conscious beings and includes all entities and 
facts that can be experienced by any conscious self. Moreover, he argued that 
the constitution of all experience, all experiencing subjects, and all experienced 
objects, practical and theoretical, natural and historical, is based on the constitution 
of inner time. Thus, no object can be given to us unless time constitutes itself for us 
in the stream of our experiences.25
The exact time of the natural sciences is constitutionally grounded on the 
shared time of intersubjective communion, and this, in turn, is grounded on the 
internal time of lived experience. The objective notion of time thus proves to be a 
dependent notion. Lévinas explains the main idea in an illuminative way: 
[Inner] time, which Husserl distinguishes from objective time (…), is thus not the form 
of a stream of consciousness which would be like another being facing the being 
of the world. The intentions and sensations which are immanent to the stream of 
consciousness are not a sort of psychological reality (…); they are implicated in the 
meaning of this deep subjectivity, about which one can no longer say that is a being.26
Husserl’s account of the constitution of time implies that human death is not 
just a worldly occurrence or an unacceptable event for us, but is also a specific 
type of impossibility. He formulates his view by stating: “the transcendental self 
cannot die and cannot be born.”27 This can easily be misunderstood as a statement 
about some specific sort of incorporeal entity – an immortal soul or an eternal spirit 
residing in a non-material universe above the world of perception. But Husserl 
explicitly rejects such readings; what is at issue in the impossibility of dying is not 
any atemporal or supratemporal entity but the integrated structure of experiential 
time.28
More precisely, Husserl’s thesis about immortality concerns the unity of inner 
time. Every intentional experience directed to whatever object, internal or external, 
23 Husserl Ms C 17 86a.
24 Husserl calls these modes of consciousness retention and protention. For a good introduction 
to these topics, see Zahavi 2003, 80 –98. For the later developments of Husserl’s reflections of time, 
see Kortooms 2002; Rodemeyer 2006; Zahavi 2004.
25 I choose to use the active phrase “time constitutes itself for us” rather than the passive “time 
is constituted for us,” since the passive phrase suggests, or may suggest, the mistaken idea that a 
subjective agent constitutes time for us.
26 Lévinas 1998 (1940), 77–78. For a detailed account of Lévinas’ complex relation to Husserl’s 
phenomenology of time, see Bernet 2002.
27 Husserl Hua11, 379–381/469–471; cf. Hua4, 103/109; Hua14, 156–157; Hua29, 332–333.
28 E.g. Husserl Hua11, 377/467; cf. Heidegger 1979 (1925), 422–442/305–320; Merleau-Ponty 
1993 (1945), 483–484/422–423.
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thingly or non-thingly, real or ideal, opens onto other experiences, preceding and 
following it in inner time.29 If every experiential moment by necessity includes 
an opening onto a future moment, then it is not possible to experience any ‘last 
moment’ of life, a moment that would halt the succession and close the futural 
opening.
This implies that each human death – however natural as an organic process 
and however expected as a historical event – bears the significance of a violent 
interruption. Further, this implies that the most proximate sense of death is that of 
a threat:
Only a human being is a person and is not just a subject of action but also sees herself 
as a subject of an open horizon of life and action, [only a human being] is permanently 
threatened by death as a rupture of this waking life and action and as an end which, in 
its indefiniteness, is merely an incessantly continuing, never-ending threat.30
Our expectations and anticipations of the future can be minimal, or they can be 
despairing, and in the nearness of death or in the process of dying they often are.31 
There is no time to do anything anymore, no time for good byes, consolation or 
forgiveness, just another gasp for breath or another moment of pain. However, the 
idea of a last moment of experiencing that would not include any opening onto a 
future is a construct or else derived from the experience of the other’s death. Each 
moment, even the moments that from the objective viewpoint are the last ones, 
open onto an unknown future. We cannot pass our ending as conscious subjects; 
we can only think our death in analogue to the deaths that we have witnessed 
or grasped through descriptions and images. Husserl’s analysis of the confusion 
is stringent: from the thought about the possible cessation of every conceivable 
particular object, one illegitimately moves to the thought of a putative cessation of a 
stream of life that gives us all such objects. “The cessation itself as cessation of the 
object presupposes non-cessation, namely, consciousness to which the cessation 
is given.”32
This analysis provides a fresh approach to Epicurus’ famous argument according 
to which death “is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and 
29 Husserl Hua11, 378/467–468; Hua14, 156–157; cf. Merleau-Ponty 1993 (1945), 249/215.
30 Husserl Hua27, 98.
31 Emmanuel Levinas’ metaphysical ethics includes a detailed discourse of human vulnerability 
and its manifestation in the nearness of death. Havi Carel’s Illness: The Cry of the Flesh (2008) 
offers a phenomenology-inspired account of living with terminal illness.
32 Husserl Hua11, 377/467. Anthony Steinbock calls such phenomena ”limit-phenomena” and 
explains their paradoxical character as follows: “By limit-phenomena, I understand those matters 
that are on the edge of accessibility in a phenomenological approach to experience, and not simply 
those matters that have historically been at the border of phenomenological discourse. For the 
purposes of this presentation, I will characterize limit-phenomena as those ‘phenomena’ that are 
given as not being able to be given. According to this general understanding of limit-phenomena, 
limit-phenomena can include the unconscious, sleep, birth and death, temporality, the other person, 
other worlds, animal and plant life, the Earth, God, etc.” (Steinbock 1995, 290; cf. Steinbock 1998).
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when death is come, we are not.”33 It suggests that Epicurus’ statement does not 
concern death as an event, or the effects or the time of any events, but concerns 
death as a limit of experiencing.
In the phenomenology-grounded reading, the core of Epicurus’ statement is 
in the realization that originally death does appear to us in the form of a worldly 
event or occurrence – or that it appears to us as an event only secondarily, through 
the mediation of other subjects. And since death is not originally articulated 
as an event, it cannot have eventual outcomes or an eventual timing for us as 
long as we retain what is original to us and not dependent on others. Thus the 
phenomenological analysis indicates that the conceptual framework of events 
misguides the interpretation of Epicurus’ insight.34
The limit-character of death does not imply that our death would not concern 
us or that Epicurus would be careless when he states that death is “the most 
awful of evils.”35 Rather than dismissing the negative character of death, the 
phenomenological analysis suggests that the phenomenon is terrifying or 
threatening exactly as a limit phenomenon. The task then becomes to understand 
the dreadfulness of death without confusing it with the evilness or harmfulness of 
the phenomena that we encounter within our lives. So the Husserlian analysis urges 
that we should exercise great caution in the conceptualization of the negativity of 
death: this evil is not that of an event or an occurrence but is the evil of a threat, “an 
incessant threat,” as Husserl calls it.36
From this reconceptualization of death we can proceed by the following 
reasoning: in so far as death is not an event for us, we should not relate to it as 
we relate to threating worldly happenings, that is, by precautions, preparations, 
provisions, supplies, insurances, and guidelines. A tomb of an ancient Egyptian 
king serves as a concrete example of a misguided articulation: death is managed 
by sacrifice of vital resources and life itself. The phenomenological analysis warns 
against such fallacious investments. Rather than trying to bar against a gigantic 
misfortune and a final catastrophe or to minimize the effects of such imaginary 
events we should aim at controlling the focus of our attention here and now.37
33 Epicurus in Laertius 1925, 10 125.
34 E.g., Luper 1996, 2003, 2009.
35 Epicuros in Laertius 1925, 10 125.
36 In this paper, I will not discuss the sense(s) in which the process of dying is, or can be said to 
be, an evil to human beings. This can be clarified by reference to several different factors: pain, loss 
of agency, isolation, weakening of cognitive functions (e.g. memory), and humiliation. It is worth 
mentioning, however, that 20th-century phenomenology involves several different perspectives 
on this process and on the harm that it involves. These include: the analyses of the intentionality 
of pain and the experience of sickness, illness and disability (e.g. Slatman and Widdershoven 
2009; Svenaeus 2001; Carel 2008); the many approaches to the care and the hospice of the dying, 
developed in the phenomenology of medicine during the last 20 years (e.g. Hamauzu, 2013); the 
recent discussions on old age and alienation inspired by Simon de Beauvoir’s The Coming of Age 
(e.g. Stoller (ed.), 2014); and Lévinas’ discourse on the dying other and the ethical demands that the 
other imposes on us.
37 Cf. Carel 2008, chapter 4.
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Further, the phenomenological analysis clarifies the task of focusing by 
demonstrating that the threatening character of death depends on its sense as 
an interruption. Clarity is gained by noticing that the dimensions of our lives that 
are most severely threatened by interruptions are its progressive dimensions, that 
is, our practical and goal-positing activities. An unfinished book manuscript, an 
aborted journey, and the reforested ruins of an old civilization all symbolize the 
tragic and threatening character of human death. The tragedy at issue is not only 
that the posited goals were not achieved and the devised plans were not executed; 
these miscarriages also nullify other activities and dimensions of life that were 
sacrificed for the projects at issue.
This suggests two alternative foci of life: in order to manage the threat of death, 
one should invest one’s life powers on activities that involve their own goals and 
on activities that can be carried forward by descendants and successors. In other 
words, life filled with solitary heroic projects, projects that can only be carried out 
single-handedly, is the type of life that suffers most from the threat of death.
Mortality and Generativity
Death and mortality also play a central role in Husserl’s account of the constitution 
of the sense of culture, i.e. cultural objects and the cultural world. Husserl argues 
that in order to understand the special character of cultural objectivity, we must 
distinguish between two kinds of conscious and self-conscious subjects: on the 
one hand, subjects who are conscious of themselves as mortal beings and, on the 
other hand, subjects who lack consciousness of themselves as mortals.
The idea here is that only subjects who are conscious of their own finitude, 
mortality and natality, can consciously relate to non-contemporary others and thus 
participate in activities and practices that involve asynchronous subjects in an 
open infinity of generative becoming. In order to grasp the core idea of Husserl’s 
distinction between full-fledged historical-cultural persons and non-persons or 
potential persons, it is instructive to study two special cases: the infant and the 
animal.
Both the infant and the animal are excluded by Husserl from the category 
of persons on the same grounds: neither experiences itself as a member of a 
generation that is connected to other generations and to an open totality of 
generations by the means of narration and writing.38
Husserl contends that both the infant and the animal consciously participate 
and intentionally live in many different types of communities of contemporaries, 
and even in communities that use signs for multiple practical purposes. However, 
what he considers crucial is that neither the infant nor the animal experiences itself 
as a being who is born and who will die, a being who shares a communal past and 
38 For a full account of generativity, see Steinbock 1995; Heinämaa 2013.
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future with other similar beings that are not present, and cannot become present 
in flesh and blood.39
The others who in our mature human experience are separated from us by our 
birth and death are not just contingently absent for us but are absent in their very 
essence: some lived before our birth, and others will live after our death. Neither 
type of other can be intended by infant and animal subjects in so far as these 
subjects lack the sense of themselves as natal and mortal beings.
We mature adults can reach both types of absent other by means of language, 
and this can be realized in several different ways. For example, we hear and read 
stories about our ancestors and we may address such others in prayer or orison, 
but we can also capture their very words as repeated by our older contemporaries 
and we can read their writing without any mediation of third parties (or any other 
mediation than language). Similarly, we can address our successors by our own 
writing and we can rehearse our younger contemporaries to repeat our own words 
for others. All this is senseless for the infant and the animal in so far as they do not 
understand themselves as mortal and natal beings who have generations of others 
behind and ahead of them in time.
Several deprivations or lacks are implied by the fundamental lack of generative 
time and trans-generational communication: in so far as the infant and the animal 
have no conscious membership in chains of generations, they cannot participate 
in transgenerational practices and cannot share the accomplishments of such 
practices. This deprives them of culture and cultural tradition in a crucial sense: 
cultural-historical goals that are shared with multiple generations in an endless 
openness; cultural-historical tools and utensils that are retained, maintained, and 
repaired in the view of coming generations; and ultimately the cultural-historical 
world with contains all this openness.40
Thus, Husserl argues that the senses of personhood, culture, tradition and 
history go hand in hand, and that all these senses depend on the senses of death, 
birth and generations. For him, no subject who lacks these fundamental senses 
can intend cultural objectivities as such, i.e. as objects that can be shared by 
asynchronous subjects. Animal and infantile subjects are empirical examples of 
such subjects. But nothing in Husserl’s argument depends on the existence of 
such subjects or on the fact that most empirical infants and all familiar animals lack 
39 Husserl Hua15, 140–141, 165–185, 280; cf. Hau1, 169/142; Hua27, 98–99.
40 Many familiar animals can of course use tools. We all have seen photographs, films, and video 
clips in which apes and birds use sticks to capture food, or an octopus unscrews a jar in order to 
grasp the crab inside. In Husserl’s analysis, such tools are given, and can be given, to the animals 
in question only in a temporally restricted way, and thus their givenness is crucially different from 
the givenness of human tools. According to him, animal tools are used merely, or at best, for present 
purposes and they are only shared with contemporaries (Husserl Hua27, 97–98; cf. Hua1, 141/111). 
They are not, and cannot be, experienced by animals as objects inherited from predecessors nor 
as objects shared with successors, since the experience of permanently absent others – other that 
cannot be or become perceivable – is not articulated for animal subjects. In other words, animal and 
tools do not, in their practical sense, imply asynchronous non-contemporary others who share goals 
with present users despite their fundamental separation in time.
Sara Heinämaa
113
awareness of their own mortality. Husserl’s argument is about possibilities: even 
if our environing world would not include any such subjects, the structure of our 
consciousness involves the possibility that there are other conscious beings who 
lack the threatening consciousness of death that characterizes our lives.41 Science 
fiction offers plenty of examples of such beings, and they all are non-existent by 
definition.
The core of Husserl’s discussion of animals and infants is in the insight that 
the open endlessness of generations is necessary for our experience of the world 
as an infinitely open whole. He argues that more limited senses of the world, e.g. 
the world as an environment or the world as a perceptual or experiential field are 
possible for non-generative subjects,42 but the full sense of the world as an open 
infinity is possible only for subjects who consciously connect to one another in an 
endless and endlessly branching chain of generations. In a manuscript, Husserl 
distinguishes the openness of the cultural-historical world from the openness of the 
perceptual world by describing his own condition as an infant as follows:
I had no notion of death and birth, even if I already had the words for these. I knew 
nothing about literature, science, arts, nothing about historical culture in general, even if 
I already had an environing world with pictures, with utensils etc. The ontic sense world 
that I had was under constant reconstruction of sense, and not by mere extension of 
sense through possessed horizons. The world-horizon had no determinate delineation, 
at least no openly, endlessly continuing determinate delineation, even if it already had 
a certain openness.43
The cultural world, inaccessible to the infant and to anyone who is unaware of 
her own mortality, is a universe of entities and processes in temporal becoming and 
generative succession.44 Already the natural world is an open, non-closed whole of 
unexpected events and unimagined things, but the openness of the cultural world 
is of a different magnitude since each of its parts refers to a history of practisers 
and users and to a multi-unit network of such histories. The possibility of becoming 
a member of a generative community and consciously participating in its activities 
41 Instead of calling the two types of subjects “animal” and “infantile” we could call them “b-subjects” 
and “c-subjects” and make a threefold distinction between a-subjects who are consciousness of their 
own mortality, b-subjects who lack such consciousness but are able to achieve it, and c-subjects 
who lack consciousness of their own mortality and cannot achieve it.
42 Husserl Hua15, 168, 626.
43 Husserl Hua15, 140.
44 As a cultural object, a picture, for example, is not merely a meaningful thing with enjoyable or 
disagreeable, practical or unpractical qualities, but also comes with a productive past and with future 
horizons of use. The picture is produced by someone and can be reproduced via certain methods 
by peoples of different times and cultures. It may be an original work of art with unique creative 
qualities but it may also be a simple sketch used for practical purposes. It may be a reproduction, 
a copy of something produced earlier and more originally, but it may also be a subtle pastiche with 
sophisticated and complex references to earlier products and modes of production. To be sure, a 
picture is subject to material damage and destruction and is easily affected by many kinds of causes 
but by the same token it is mendable and repairable: if it is ripped up, it can be patched together and 
if it is damaged by damp, it can be restored by cleaning.
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is open for the infant, but the realization of this possibility requires that the infant 
consciously grasps the factuality of his or her own natality and the inevitability of 
his or her own future death.
Conclusion
I have argued that classical Husserlian phenomenology provides powerful 
analytical tools that allow us to distinguish between several senses of human death 
and to separate them on the basis of their constitutional primacy. I used these tools 
to distinguish between three different senses death: death as an event, death as 
threat, and death as impossibility.
I argued that our own death is given to us in two different ways: directly and 
via the lives of others. In the first case our death appears to us as an unreachable 
limit and in the second case it appears to us as a worldly event. These two senses 
combine in concrete experiences but they can be distinguished by the analytical 
methods of transcendental phenomenology. These distinctions help us understand 
the motivational links between our experiences in facing death and the suffering of 
the dying.
My analysis also clarified the constitutive dependencies between the two 
senses of death: constitutionally the idea of one’s own death as an event among 
other events depends on the experience of death as a threatening limit of living. 
Only a human being who is capable of grasping the temporal limits of his or her 
own life is able to understand the unparalleled meaning that the other’s death has 
for the other. The explication of death in the sense of threat further illuminated 
Epicurus’ dual discourse on death that emphasizes the complete insignificance of 
death and the incomparable evil of dying.
Finally, I explicated the sense in which death is not simply the opposite of life but 
has a constructive role in the constitution of cultural objectivities and the cultural 
world.
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